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THE CONSTITUTION IS DEAD, LONG LIVE THE CONSTITUTION!  
THE CREATION, ENDURANCE, AND MODIFICATION OF MODERN REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONS* 
 
Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós** 
I. INTRODUCTION 

 Constitutions come and go. Some were born illegally, but still manage to gain legitimacy and 
endure. Others observed the established processes of adoption yet floundered shortly after. This is so, 
because the validity of a constitution is not wholly dependent on the legality of its creation. On the contrary, 
how a constitution is created, why it endures, and how it changes depends on the legitimacy, and thus 
authority, generated by the process of creation and the level of connection, and thus fidelity, the current 
generation has with the content of the original constitutional project. There is also interdependency between 
these stages of constitutional existence, since how a constitution is created will also impact its endurance 
and future developments, including possible modifications. All of this is particularly true and relevant in 
the context of revolutionary constitutions, both in terms of the processes that generated them and their 
substantive content. 
 This article will analyze these stages of constitutional existencenamely: (1) creation; (2) 
endurance; and (3) changeand how normative factors such as legality, legitimacy, authority, connection, 
and fidelity impact each of them. It will also analyze the interaction between the stages among themselves 
and how they impact one another. My main normative proposals are that: (1) highly democratic processes 
of creation, even if illegal or extralegal, can generate sufficient legitimacy and authority so as to be accepted 
by the community as valid; (2) revolutionary processes of constitutional creation that reflect and capture 
the deeply-rooted preferences of the social majority will endure, so long as the original social consensus 
holds; and (3) when a new process of constitutional creation takes place, the available avenues of 
constitutional change will depend on the contrasting levels of legitimacy and social connection of the 
original and new constitutional creation processes. 
 In particular, I propose that: (1) legitimacy and authority are the main normative factors relevant to 
the validity of constitutional creation; (2) both legitimacy and authority, on the one hand, and connection 
and fidelity on the other, will be almost equally crucial to constitutional endurance; and (3) that connection 
and fidelity will be the deciding factors when engaging in constitutional change, linking up with the 
legitimacy and authority of the process of change itself, particularly in the case of replacement. These 
proposals require a normative model that discusses each individual interaction between stage and 
conceptual factor, analyzes their interdependency, and proposes a more general explanation as to the critical 
process of constitutional development that allows a particular society to establish, maintain, and modify its 
constitutional structures. 
As we will see, most of the answers to these questions are to be found in the realm of constitutional 
politics and not in the technicalities of law. Because of the central role modern constitutions play in the 
development of a particular political community, there is a critical intersection between politics and law 
that increases when there is a particularly transcendental social process that requires or generates a legal 
revolution.1  
 Constitutions are at the heart of any revolutionary change in law and politics, whether as an obstacle 
to these transformative processes, as their main ally, or as their product. As such, there is nothing as counter-
revolutionary as an old constitution on its way out, and nothing as revolutionary as a new constitution on

*  This Article is based on a Paper presented at the 14th Inter-University Graduate Conference at Cornell Law School in Ithaca, New 
York, April, 2019. 
** B.A. & M.A. (University of Puerto Rico-Río Piedras), J.D. (University of Puerto Rico Law School), LL.M. (Harvard Law School); S.J.D. 
(Georgetown University Law Center). Assistant Professor of Law, Interamerican University of Puerto Rico Law School. I would like to thank my 
research assistant, Zoé Negrón Comas, for all her incredible help and contributions. 
1  Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, Post-Liberal Constitutionalism, 54 TULSA L. REV. 1, 37-41 (2018). 
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its way in. How this process plays out requires a deeper look. In particular, we need to analyze how a 
revolutionary process can impact the different levels of constitutional existence, specifically as to issues of 
legitimacy, authority, connection, and fidelity between future social majorities and the one that originated 
the current constitutional project in the first place. 
 This article is divided into the following parts. Part I is this introduction. Part II will focus on the 
normative factors that impact the different stages of constitutional existence and their validity. In particular, 
we will discuss concepts such as legality, legitimacy, authority, connection, and fidelity. Part III will offer 
an analysis of the different stages of constitutional existence. In particular, we will discuss each stage 
(creation, endurance, and change) separately, so as to learn their respective inner-workings, and we will 
also analyze the impact each of the normative concepts discussed in Part II has on the different stages of 
constitutional existence. Finally, we will discuss how each stage interacts with the other two. Part IV will 
offer some final thoughts. 
II. NORMATIVE FACTORS 

A. Introduction 

 In this Part we analyze the different normative factors that impact how a constitution is created, 
why it endures, and how it changes in the future. Each factor will be applied to each particular stage in Part 
III, and they are directly related to the issue of constitutional validity, in other words, the continued 
acceptance of a constitutional process and order by a particular community. 
 The first set of factorslegality, illegality, and extra-legalitydeal with the relationship between 
each stage of constitutional existence and established legal order and its relation with the legal processes 
and structures used to create, maintain, and modify a constitution. Here, the formal-informal dichotomy is 
also analyzed. The second set of factorslegitimacy and authoritydeal with the issue of validity and 
social acceptance of a particular constitutional action, particularly creation and endurance. The final set of 
factorsconnection and fidelitydeal with the level of social support of the substantive content of the 
constitutional project. 
 
B. Legality, Illegality, and Extra-Legality 
 
 Legality refers to the compatibility of a particular action, process, or rule with the existing legal 
order. In particular, it refers to their compatibility with pre-established formal structures that are accepted 
as the current legal system. Ideally, these structures are also the result of a legal exercise, tracing back to 
some original source of legal authority, sometimes called the “rule of recognition.”2 Such a rule “helps us 
to determine whether a given rule is indeed a valid law,”3 since it constitutes the “ultimate and supreme rule 
because it itself is not subject to another test for its own validity nor draws its existence from another rule.”4 
 As most relevant here, Black’s Law Dictionary defines legality as “[t]he quality, state, or condition 
of being allowed by law.”5 In turn, the condition of being allowed by law can be met either through an 
express authorization or, in some instances, the absence of a direct prohibition. 
In the constitutional realm, this concept is somewhat tricky, since the only source that can be used to analyze 
the legality of a particular action is the constitution itself. In other words, the legality of a constitutional 
action can only be analyzed through the structures and norms laid out in the constitution. But because an 
accepted constitution is the quintessential example of a rule of recognition, the issue of legality will be 
relative and, most important, context-specific. This is so because a new constitution, while it may be 

2  Joseph D'Agostino, Law's Necessary Violence, 22 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 121, 184 (2017). 
3  Norman P. Ho, Internationalizing and Historicizing Hart’s Theory of Law, 10 WASH. U. JURISP. REV. 183, 190 (2017). 
4  See id. 
5  Legality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
2
Barry Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol25/iss1/2
Spring 2020    The Constitution Is Dead 
 


37  

 
adopted illegally, will determine its own legal status  if it is accepted as valid by the community. When this 
happens, the previous illegality will be cured by the new legal order. 
 Illegality refers to situations of a direct violation of the structures and norms established in the 
current legal system. In other words, it is a direct contradiction to, and thus incompatible with, the pre-
established legal system. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, this term can be defined as “[a]n act that is 
forbidden by law; the state of not being legally authorized; [t]he quality, state, or condition of being 
unlawful.”6 As relevant here, illegality focuses primarily on actions and processes that are either expressly 
prohibited by the legal system or sufficiently in tension with it as to be considered incompatible. 
 In the constitutional realm, this concept applies to actions that are in direct contravention to the 
specific, and sometimes exclusive, processes and norms recognized by the constitution, particularly as to 
its modification or replacement.7 Interestingly, what starts out as illegal can become legal through the 
establishment of a new constitutional order that is accepted by the population, thus becoming its own rule 
of recognition. 
 Extra-legality refers to those actions or processes that, while outside the formal structures and 
norms of the existing legal order, are not necessarily in direct violation of, or in contradiction with, that 
system. For its part, Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term as “[b]eyond the province of law.”8 Extra-
legality occupies a gray area between legality and illegality.  
 Admittedly, sometimes it’s difficult to distinguish illegality from extra-legality. In some instances, 
what starts as apparently illegal may become extra-legal.9 For now, the main distinguishing factor is that 
while illegality is characterized as a direct violation of formal law, extra-legality operates outside what is 
either permitted or prohibited. In relative terms, however, it is safe to state that extra-legality is closer to 
illegality than to legality. 
 This trichotomy is related to the formal-informal dichotomy used by other scholars,10 particularly 
in the context of constitutional change, but that can also be used when analyzing constitutional creation.  In 
the context of change, Marshfield explains that informal change “happens when binding constitutional rules 
are modified without any corresponding alteration of the constitutional text.”11 As such, formal change 
requires an actual modification of the content of the constitution itself. But the informal-formal dichotomy 
is not limited to issues of change. For example, it can be applied to the creation stage. Formality is mostly, 
though not inherently, related to legality; while informality can have both illegal and extra-legal 
characteristics. 
 
C. Legitimacy and Authority 

 Legitimacy is a normative concept that stems from the public’s approval of a particular process.12 
Authority is produced when that approval generates general acceptance and recognition of its validity.13 In 
that sense, legitimacy creates authority. Both allow a community to accept a constitutional process, and its 
resulting content and operation, as valid. 

6  Illegality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
7  Peter Paczolay, Constitutional Transitional and Legal Continuity, 8 CONN. J. INT’L L. 559, 562-63 (1993). 
8  Extra-legal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
9  Philip K. Y. Lau, Revolutionary Disobedience, 22 BARRY L. REV. 199, 247-48 (2017). 
10  See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Respecting the Mystery of Constitutional Change, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2017); Carlos Bernal, 
Foreword-Informal Constitutional Change: A Critical Introduction and Appraisal, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (2014). 
11  Marshfield, supra note 10, at 1058. 
12  Or Bassok, The Supreme Court's New Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 153, 185 (2013). 
13  Id. 

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 For purposes of this article, legitimacy and authority will mostly emerge from process,14 
particularly as it relates to creation.15 In that sense, in terms of the different stages of constitutional 
existence, legitimacy and authority will play a greater role in creation, share the spotlight with connection 
and fidelity in terms of endurance, and perform a smaller role in terms of constitutional change. Of course, 
the legitimacy and authority of the process of change, particularly when dealing with replacement, can be 
seen as the start of a new process of constitutional creation, thus completing the circle. 
 Legality does not inherently relate to, or even necessarily generate, legitimacy.16 A perfectly legal 
process can be characterized as illegitimate if the legal system itself has become suspect and its popular 
support has evaporated.17 At the same time, a completely illegal process can receive sufficient popular 
acceptance so as to be accepted and seen as legitimate.18 In that sense, popular approval can legitimize an 
“otherwise illegal” act.19 
 
D. Connection and Fidelity 

 By connection, I refer to the level of substantive agreement between the current social majority and 
the content of the original constitutional project—more to the point, whether the policy views of the current 
generation resemble the policy preferences that the constitutional generation entrenched. Whether it is 
because the constitution (1) adequately reflected the policy preferences of the social majority, and those 
preferences endure; or (2) managed to influence and persuade future generations into accepting the policy 
preferences entrenched in the constitution as substantively desirable, then this creates sufficient connection 
so as to allow the constitutional project to endure with the support of the current social majority. 
 Fidelity is the result of connection, and it refers to the level of allegiance that the current generation 
has with the basic content of the constitution, the constitution’s continued status as authoritative, and the 
current generation’s willingness to obey it and defend it from any potential attack. The ultimate 
manifestation of connection and fidelity is veneration.20 
 
III. STAGES OF CONSTITUTIONAL EXISTENCE & THE ROLE OF NORMATIVE FACTORS 

A. Creation 

1. Introduction 
 
 Creation is, almost by definition, the critical stage of constitutional existence. Without birth, there 
can be no endurance, let alone growth. But more importantly, it is during constitutional creation that the 
quest for legitimacy becomes strongest, particularly when the previous legal order resists the change and 

14  For a different view as to a possible source of legitimacy, see Joel Colón-Ríos, The Legitimacy of the Juridical: Constituent Power, 
Democracy, and the Limits of Constitutional Reform, 48 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 199 (2010). 
15  There are, of course, other sources of legitimacy and authority other than process. Our focus on process is one of emphasis. See AYSE 
KADAYIFCI-ORELLANA, ISLAMIC NARRATIVES ON PEACE AND WAR IN PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 5 (2007). 
16  See Raymond Ku, Consensus of the Governed: The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 535, 583 (1995) 
(referencing the spectrum of legitimacy and legality). 
17  Bassok, supra note 12, at 187. 
18  Id. 
19  Lau, supra note 9, at 225. See also Richard Albert, Four Unconstitutional Constitutions and Their Democratic Foundations, 50 
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 169, 175-76 (2017) [hereinafter Unconstitutional Constitutions] (discussing the illegality of the formation of the United 
States Constitutions when breaking from the Articles of Confederation). 
20  Ozan O. Varol, Constitutional Stickiness, 49 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 899, 907 (2016). 

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the new order can be characterized as illegal or extralegal. The legitimacy of the process that creates the 
constitution will be crucial to the issue of whether it is accepted as valid by the political community.21 
 As we will see, it is here where legality clashes with legitimacy more directly. In the end, a 
successful creation process will generate its own legality. For now, the critical element is to recognize the 
normative and analytical challenges produced by the start of a formal process of constitutional adoption. 
This is what Arato calls “the problem of the beginning.”22 In other words, a constitution’s immediate fate 
will depend on its survival of the birth process and its acceptance as valid by the community.23 
 As such, process will be key to acquiring legitimacy and authority, thus allowing the new 
constitution to establish a new legal order. When this happens, the constitution’s creation becomes the 
ultimate source of the new legality, generating a fictional, but accepted, origin story that can endure in the 
future and resist future calls for its early demise. When the creation process is seen as legitimate and 
authoritative, then the new constitution will be characterized as valid, thus ushering in a new constitutional 
order that will serve as the core of the resulting legal system. 
 
2. Constitutional Politics vs. Ordinary Politics 

 In order to understand how constitutional creation processes can attain legitimacy and authority, 
we must analyze the important differences between the exercise of constitutional politics as opposed to 
engaging in ordinary politics. This distinction is critical in the particular context of revolutionary 
constitutional creation processes that represent a challenge to the existing legal order. 
  Blount, Elkins, and Ginsburg explain, “[n]early all the normative and positive work on 
constitutions proceeds from the assumption that constitutional politics are fundamentally different in 
character from ordinary politics.”24 And not only are these types of politics different, constitutional politics 
are seen to have, almost inherently, superior normative force.25 This is particularly so when the exercise of 
constitutional politics, unlike ordinary politics, manages to adequately reflect the popular will and the policy 
preferences of the social majority.26 This is strengthened when the exercise of constitutional politics is 
carried out through highly democratic and popular processes and structures.27 This combination of 
democratic process and substantive alignment creates an irresistible normative force.28 When this happens, 
the actual legality of the process, as measured by the previous legal system, becomes mostly irrelevant.29 
 Of course, constitutional politics need not always generate a formal constitution. In fact, as we will 
see, the exercise of constitutional politics can also be informal and be used in different stages and instances. 
But one of the main articulations of constitutional politics is, undoubtedly, the formal adoption of a new 
constitution.30 In this article, I focus mostly on the exercise of constitutional politics that results in the formal 
adoption of a new constitution. 
 Curiously enough, we can also imagine a community adopting a “constitution” through a process 
that resembles ordinary politics instead of constitutional politics. But, as we will see, “constitutions” that 
are the result of ordinary politics lack authority and most likely will not endure or at least will be subject to 

21  Another source of validity, as we will see, is the public’s agreement with the substantive content of the new constitution. I believe that 
process legitimacy provides a stronger normative base for authority. See Andrew Kilberg, We the People: The Original Meaning of Popular 
Sovereignty, 100 VA. L. REV. 1061, 1077 (2014). 
22  Andrew Arato, Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 191, 194 (1995). 
23  Kilberg, supra note 21.  
24  Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins & Tom Ginsburg, Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 42, (Tom Ginsburg eds., Cambridge University Press 2012). 
25  Id. 
26  Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 40.  
27   Blount et al., supra note 24, at 42. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  David M. Mednicoff, A Tale of Three Constitutions: Common Drives and Diverse Outcomes in Post-2010 Arab Legal Politics, 28 
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 215, 243 (2014). 
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constant modifications through the future exercise of constitutional, or even ordinary politics. This reflects 
the critical link between constitutional politics on the one hand, and legitimacy and authority on the other. 
 This is so because constitutional politics is not about form but is instead about process and content. 
More importantly, it’s about the democratic engagement of the People in an exercise of direct self-
government. In that sense, for example, a single-issue national referendum about an important subject can 
be considered an exercise in constitutional politics, while adopting a constitution without popular 
participation or democratic authorization can be considered to be outside of constitutional politics. The 
normative power of a constitution is dependent on whether its adoption was the exercise of constitutional 
politics as opposed to ordinary politics. 
 Of course, constitutional politics tend to be rare or extraordinary, although there could be periods 
of heightened democratic activity that stretch through a considerable time period.31 Revolutionary situations 
are a prime example of this.32 As a result, constitutional politics “should be permitted to determine the 
nation’s life only during rare periods of heightened political consciousness.”33 In that sense, ordinary 
politics are what happen between extraordinary periods when constitutional politics are exercised. 
 When the exercise of constitutional politics actually results in the adoption of a new constitution, 
then the normative effects of that exercise can remain well after the exercise is over and, as we will see, 
will probably even endure until a new exercise of constitutional politics requires a course correction.34 In 
that sense, ordinary politics will be exercised within the framework established by the constitution that 
resulted from the exercise of constitutional politics. 
 In particular, we will also see how a constitution that is formally adopted as an exercise of 
constitutional politics by way of a highly democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially 
transcendental process of creation has the strongest normative case as to legitimacy and authority, 
independent of legality.35 A constitution created by this type of process will, in turn, have a better chance 
to endure and will require a similar exercise to change it.36 
 For now, the main point is to recognize the important distinction between ordinary politics and 
constitutional politics. While this distinction will be relevant to all stages of constitutional existence, it 
seems beneficial to include this analysis at the creation stage. How a constitution is created, and whether it 
is the result of a legitimate exercise of constitutional politics, will impact its entire lifespan. The type of 
constitutional project I wish to focus on in this article is premised precisely on the exercise of constitutional 
politics from the very beginning. Revolutionary constitutions tend to be adopted through an illegal or 
extralegal process of creation, so their legitimacy will depend on the level of legitimacy and authority 
generated by the democratic exercise of constitutional politics.37 In other words, when a constitution is 
created illegally or extra-legally it will be crucial, in order to achieve legitimacy and authority and thus be 
regarded as valid by the community, that it was adopted through the exercise of constitutional politics;38 In 
particular, if that exercise can be characterized as democratic and socially transcendental. 
 
 
 
 
3. Formal Adoption 

31  Colon-Rios, supra note 14, at 17-18.  
32  Id. 
33  Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L. J. 1012, 1022 (1984). 
34  When this happens, “[a] constitutional majority need not be an eternal political one; it is entitled to lose a few elections now and then. 
The crucial question lies elsewhere: if the majority that adopted the constitution is actually a constitutional one or merely a temporary political 
one that simply coincided with the constitution-making process”. Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 47. I will return to this issue when discussing 
constitutional endurance. 
35  See generally Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Justin Blount, The Citizen as Founder: Public Participation in Constitutional 
Approval, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 361 (2008). See also Blount et al., supra note 24; Arato, supra note 22; Farinacci- Fernós, supra note 1. 
36  Blount et al., supra note 24, 50-53. See also Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 362. 
37  Blount et al., supra note 24, at 40 n.5. See also Lau, supra note 9, at 44-45. 
38  Lau, supra note 9, at 216. 

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
 The exercise of constitutional politics can come in many shapes and sizes, many of them informal, 
and be present in different stages of constitutional existence.39 But when it comes to actual constitutional 
creation, as the first stage of that existence, we must focus on processes of creation that actually culminate 
with the formal adoption of a new constitution. The same applies at the very end of a constitution’s existence 
when it is replaced by a new one. Here, the final stage ends with the beginning of a new cycle of 
constitutional existence, with all the normative implications that entails, particularly in light of the model 
discussed in this article.40 
 In other words, while this model allows for exercises of constitutional politics that do not 
necessarily result in the formal adoption of a new constitution, in order to have a complete analysis of 
constitutional creation, endurance, and modification, we must focus our attention to processes that do result 
in the adoption of a formal constitution.41 By doing so, we are able to better test the normative validity of 
the model and fully appreciate the full picture of constitutional existence from beginning to end and back 
to a new beginning. 
 
4. Process of Creation and Revolutionary Constitutions 

 When a new constitution is created, the previous legal systemnormally structured through a 
constitutionis replaced.42 This is particularly true in the context of revolutionary processes of 
constitutional creation that result in the formal adoption of a new constitution, which can be characterized 
as illegal or extralegal.43 As such, constitutional creation can be seen as the culmination of a process of 
change and, simultaneously, as the start of a new one. In that sense, one constitution’s end is another’s 
beginning.44 
 Constitutional creation has several moving parts.45 In order to have a complete picture of what this 
entails, we must focus on both (1) issues of process and structure and (2) the political, historical, and social 
forces that drive it. These two sets of factors interact in every stage of constitutional creation but are 
particularly vital during the creation stage.46 
 In the particular context of the exercise of revolutionary constitutional politics, the creation process 
begins even before the first drafter is selected or first word written.47 This is what Blount, Elkins, and 
Ginsburg call the pre-drafting stage, which includes “the mobilization of interests (and counter interests) 
prior to the preparation of a text.”48 When this happens, the formal framing process becomes the culmination 
of a broader social phenomenon.49 As such, the actual framing process becomes inherently linked with the 
pre-drafting stages, particularly as it relates to the social and historical forces that drove it.50 When the pre-

39  See generally id.  
40  See Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 
1835-43 (2016). 
41  ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 53 (2009). 
42  Vicky C. Jackson, What’s in a Name? Reflection on Timing, Naming, and Constitution-Making, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1249, 1260 
(2008). 
43  There could be instances in which a revolutionary process decides to use legally available tools to establish a new constitutional order. 
Historically, that has not been the case. But it is conceptually plausible that this may happen. See generally id. Cf. Blount et al., supra note 24. 
44  This would complete the circle of constitutional existence, by which the normative elements used to analyze one constitution’s end 
will coincide with the normative elements used to analyze its replacement’s beginning. See Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 64. 
45  “Constitution making is as ubiquitous as it is mysterious.” Blount et al., supra note 24, at 31. 
46  See Blount et al., supra  note 24, at 34. See generally Elkins et al., supra note 35. 
47  Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 45. 
48  Blount et al., supra note 24, at 34-35. 
49  Id. at 35. 
50  Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 46. 
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drafting stage amasses legitimacy and authority, the framing and ratification stages benefit from it and 
acquire even more normative force.51 
 In terms of the actual process and structure, this pre-drafting stage includes determinations related 
to actors,52 timing, and the actual operation of the adoption mechanism itself.53 In terms of the role of the 
relevant political, historical, and social forces, the pre-drafting stage will be critical.54 It is here that the 
nature and orientation of the constitutional process will be decided.55  
 As Blount, Elkins, and Ginsburg propose, other stages of constitutional creation include drafting, 
consultation, deliberation, adoption, and ratification.56 This includes the actual selection of the drafting 
delegates, the operation of the deliberative body, and the roles the People will play during the entire 
process.57 This can span from passive observation to active participation, including mandates to the 
delegates, periodic consultation, sending direct proposals, and eventual popular ratification.58 
 The pre-drafting stage will be the critical moment where the process will be able to acquire 
legitimacy and authority, particularly if it’s highly democratic, participatory, and popular.59 In revolutionary 
contexts, the pre-drafting stage will be the direct result of the political force generated by the social 
movement that brought about the revolutionary situation.60 
 
5. Clean Slate vs. Continuity 

 As Vicky Jackson suggests, “[c]onstitutions are written under a wide range of circumstances.”61  In 
terms of their role in a particular community’s legal system, a constitution is either the first of its kind or it 
replaces a previous one.62 And even when it is the first one adopted by a particular communitylike what 
happens immediately after national independence, for exampleit rarely, if ever, means that there was no 
previous governing source or device that the new constitution will replace.63 New constitutions always 
replace something that came before them.64 
 As such, the adoption of a new constitution, in varying degrees, represents the end of a previous 
legal order and the birth of a new one. This is so even when the new constitution is compatible with the 
previous order and does not constitute a clean break with, or rejection of, the past system.65  
 Jackson identifies three types of circumstances in which a new constitution takes effect: (1) a clean 
break from the previous order, which includes so-called constitutional moments;66 (2) a more incremental 
process of constitutional change; and (3) transitional constitutions.67 For his part, Andrew Arato proposes 
other circumstances in which constitutions are adopted, including gradual, legal, and extralegal processes.68  

51  See Eugene D. Mazo, The Upstream Problem in Constitutionalism, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 795, 827-828 (2015) (proposing a 
spectrum as to the different versions of constitutional creation). 
52  Actors can be early-stage, later-stage, or exercise veto power. Blount et al., supra note 24, at 35. 
53  Id. at 34. 
54  Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 46. 
55  Mazo, supra note 51, at 829. 
56  Blount et al., supra note 24, at 34. Cf. Jennifer Widner, Constitution Drafting in Post-Conflict States Symposium: Constitution Writing 
in Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1522 (2008). 
57  Blount et al., supra note 24, at 35. 
58  See generally Blount et al., supra note 24. 
59  See generally id. See also Widner, supra note 56. 
60  Jackson, supra note 42, at 1258. 
61  See id. at 1260. 
62  See id.  
63  See id. 
64  See generally Jackson, supra note 42. See also Lau, supra note 9, at 117. 
65  Jackson, supra note 42, at 1265-67. 
66  I will return to the issue of constitutional moments when addressing the change stage. For now, it’s worth pointing out that 
constitutional moments are the exercise of constitutional politics that generate a change, however informal, to the current constitutional system. 
For purposes of the creation stage, I will employ the broader term of constitutional politics. Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1022. 
67  Jackson, supra note 42, at 1260. 
68  Arato, supra note 22, at 194. 

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 A clean break occurs when the new constitutional order totally replaces the previous one, including 
the adoption of a new system of government and an alternative outlook as to the development of society.69 
This type of clean break can be found in countries that have recently gained national independence or as 
the result of a revolutionary process that topples the ancien régime of a particular society.70 In these 
circumstances, the new constitution represents a rejection of the previous system and its that system’s 
conscious replacement by a different one. Clean breaks are normally, though not inherently, done through 
illegal or extralegal processes of creation.71 Once the existing legal order loses its authority and generates 
the historical conditions for its replacement, the new order will not likely adhere to the previous one’s 
structures for constitutional replacement.72 
 Another possibility is that the new constitution merely serves as an update that enhances and 
develops, but does not structurally change, the previous legal order.73 In these instances, there is an 
unbroken chain between both constitutions. While a new constitution may be adopted, a new system is 
not.74 As such, this type of replacement does not constitute a paradigm shift and will most likely be done 
through legally recognized channels.75 While it is possible that more informal or extralegal mechanisms are 
also used, this type of constitutional creation is done within the existing legality.76 
 In terms of the main normative proposal of this article, I will focus mostly on constitutions that 
represent a clean break from the previous system, particularly those that were created by an extralegal or 
illegal revolutionary process. Precisely because they are clean breaks, these constitutions tend to be created 
outside the legally recognized channels of constitutional change or adoption.77 Revolutionary constitutions 
are hardly ever the result of legality.78 But, as we’ve seen, they almost always are the result of a process 
that generates enough legitimacy and authority to trump its illegal or extralegal nature.79 Blount, Elkins, 
and Ginsburg’s reference to constitutions that are created in moments of crisis is applicable here.80 This 
also applies in the context of revolutionary processes that result in the formal adoption of a new 
constitution.81 
 
6. Normative Factors 

i. Legality vs. Legitimacy of Process as the Main Source of Authority 
 
 As we saw, legality does not equal legitimacy.82 And illegality does not automatically entail 
illegitimacy.83 In that sense, the link between legality and legitimacy is incidental, not inherent. 
First of all, if the current legal order is eroded, weakened, or outright challenged, legality becomes 
irrelevant.84 In these circumstances, not only does legality stop generating legitimacy, it can actually 

69  Jackson, supra note 42, at 1260. 
70  See id.  
71  Lau, supra note 9, at 248 (“Revolutionary disobedience creates a constitutional moment by first breaking into illegality, by means of 
which it defines the higher law of the land”). 
72  See id. at 226. See also Widner, supra note 56, at 1521. 
73  Jackson, supra note 42, at 1265-67. 
74  See id. 
75  See id. 
76  See id. 
77  Lau, supra note 9, at 248-49. 
78  See id. at 248. 
79  Lau, supra note 9, at 248. 
80  Blount et al., supra note 24, at 39, 42 (“[C]onstitutions are typically adopted during moments of crisis, and so likely to produce more 
attention to the general welfare and less likely to be dominated by special interests”). See also Lau, supra note 9, at 220. 
81  Blount et al., supra note 24, at 40. 
82  Lau, supra note 9, at 213. 
83  See id. at 213, 248. 
84  See id. at 226. 
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generate illegitimacy.85 In other words, there are situations where following the rules of a dying legal order 
can actually be perceived as undemocratic and illegitimate by the public.86 By the same token, ignoring 
those rules can actually command popular support and approval.87 
 However, I must concede that if the current legal order still commands sufficient public acceptance, 
then legality can bolster the case for legitimacy and illegality can breed illegitimacy.88 But that is a relative 
situation.  It merely means that, in these circumstances, legality can generate some legitimacy.89 But that 
reality can be overridden by the superior normative force that can be generated by an illegal or extralegal 
exercise of constitutional politics.90 In other words, the more legitimacy the current legal order has 
(legality), the stronger the normative force of the illegal or extralegal process needs to be.91 
 As such, legality, even when it can generate some legitimacy, is not legitimacy’s main source. On 
the contrary, I propose that the main, though not exclusive, source of legitimacy as to the adoption of a new 
constitutional order is the nature of the process that generates that new constitutional order.92 In particular, 
I propose that a revolutionary constitutional adoption process (that can be characterized as democratic, 
public, participatory, popular, and socially transcendental) starts out with almost irresistible legitimizing 
force. This is so, because “[p]ublic involvement in constitutional making is increasingly considered to be 
essential for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the process.”93 
 In other words, when the People exercise constitutional politics through a democratic, public, 
participatory, popular, and socially transcendental process of creation, legitimacy almost necessarily 
follows.94 This type of adoption process constitutes the strongest version as to the exercise of constitutional 
politics that will command the greatest public support and acceptance, precisely because of the nature of 
popular involvement in the creation process.95  
 And this will be independent of whether that process was legal, extralegal, or even illegal.96 If a 
new constitution is generated by a process that is accepted by the public, then it becomes legal.97 When a 
new constitutional order is adopted by a self-governing people, a new legality is born.98 
 As a result, we can conclude that: (1) legitimacy is the most important factor of constitutional 
creation; (2) the process of creation can be a crucial source of legitimacy; and (3) democratic, public, 
participatory, popular, and socially transcendental processes have the strongest case for legitimacy and, 
thus, authority. In that sense, authority is the result of legitimacy and not legality. This authority allows the 
new constitution to be accepted as valid by the political community and for a new constitutional order to 
begin. 
 
 
 

85  See id. at 247. 
86  See id. at 213. 
87  See id. at 248. 
88  See id. at 210, 214.  
89  See id. at 213. 
90  See id. at 226. 
91  See id. at 226, 247. 
92  Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 756 (2011) (proposing that “authority depends on perception.”). 
93  See generally Elkins et al., supra note 35. See also Blount et al., supra note 24, at 50 (“The loss of design consistency may be offset 
by resultant gains in legitimacy”). Yet, the same authors suggest caution (“The claim that participatory design processes generate constitutions 
with higher levels of legitimacy and popular support has been subject to only limited study”) Id. at 51. But the key is to transcend the focus on 
procedure and structure, and focus more on the entire social process that impacts constitutional creation. That is why I’ve added other important 
normative features like the democratic, public, popular and socially transcendental nature of the framing process. It is from the combined effect of 
these factors, including participation, that we can identify the resulting normative force and legitimizing effect. 
94  See Blount et al., supra note 24, 50-53. See also Arato, supra note 22, at 192 (“[N]on-democratic procedures of constitution making 
cannot be justified today”). 
95  See Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 41 (“When writing a constitution, the people tend to be more involved, engaged, interested, 
attentive, and vigilant”). 
96  Lau, supra note 9, at 24-25, 45. 
97  See id. at 19, 45. 
98  See id. at 18. 

10
Barry Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol25/iss1/2
Spring 2020    The Constitution Is Dead 
 


45  

 
ii. Illegitimate Entrenchment 

 As we previewed when discussing the distinction between constitutional politics and ordinary 
politics, a key factor when analyzing the formal adoption of a constitutionand its direct impact on 
endurance and possible future modificationis whether the constitution that was created accurately reflects 
the popular will and the policy preferences of the social majority.99 While I believe process will be the main 
factor as to legitimacy and authority at the creation stage, substance will also be critical for two reasons. 
First, because it will either confirm or weaken the legitimacy and authority generated by the creation 
process, and second, because it will determine the level of connection and fidelity required for the 
constitution to endure in time. 
 As such, it is imperative that the democratic, public, participatory, popular, and socially 
transcendental process of constitutional creationwhich by itself generates considerable normative 
forcealso manages to produce a constitution that actually reflects the deep-seeded views of the social 
majority.100 In other words, the actual content of the constitution can be described as the direct result of the 
exercise of constitutional politics by a self-governing People.101 This will be key for the endurance stage. 
 There is always a risk that a constitution will adopt the policy preferences of a temporary majority 
that just happened to control the framing body,102 instead of the widely-held views of the social majority 
that will survive passing political fluctuations.103 When this occurs, the process may still be considered 
legitimate, but not necessarily its substantive outcome.104 As John Elster suggests, “[i]n a constituent 
assembly, a small partisan majority may be able to impose its preferences not only on the current majority, 
but also on a posterity in which it may itself be in a minority.”105 
 But this risk is inherent to any constitutional creation process.106 I strongly believe that this risk is 
considerably minimized when the constitution was generated as the result of a democratic, public, 
participatory, public, and socially transcendental process of creation. This is so, because this is the type of 
process that is more likely to reflect the substantive policy preferences of the majority.107 As we will see 
shortly, this is crucial as to the issue of constitutional endurance.108 
 
A. Endurance 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 This section asks two important questions: (1) should constitutions endure; and (2) why they endure. 
I will also analyze how different types of constitutions interact with the overall issue of endurance and 
longevity. From a purely empirical point of view, “most constitutions die young.”109 But before analyzing 

99  Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 374-75. See also Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 15, 38. 
100  See generally Elkins et al., supra note 35. (“[R]emarkably little empirical evidence of the impact of participation on outcomes.”). Yet 
it is not hard to envision that when the People directly participate in the constitutional creation process, it will result in a constitution that 
faithfully reflects the substantive policy views of the social majority. Historically, this has resulted in the creation of progressive constitutions that 
reflect the views of the People and not the elites. 
101  See id. at 381. 
102  See DIANA KAPISZEWSKI, GORDON SILVERSTEIN & ROBERT KAGAN, INTRODUCTION TO CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES 
IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 8 (Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert Kagan eds., 2013). 
103  See Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 38-39. 
104  See John Elster, Clearing and Strengthening the Channels of Constitution Making, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, supra 
note 56, at 15, 18.  
105  See id. at 18. See also Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 40 (“When a dying political movement entrenches its program in a 
constitution, there is a democratic deficit that must be addressed”). 
106  See Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 47. 
107  See id. at 45. 
108  See infra p. 26.  
109  Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 1. 
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the more normative questions, which require an application of the normative factors discussed in part II, 
we should first explain what we mean by constitutional endurance.  
 Endurance means operational longevity; in other words, if the original constitution has stood the 
test of time and still functions as the supreme source of law.110 For his part, Richard Albert proposes an 
important distinction between constitutional resilience and endurance.111 While endurance relates to the 
formal continuity of the constitutional text, resilience, defined by the author as “endurance plus,” refers to 
the uninterrupted normative operation of that text.112 Both concepts are within the scope of this analysis. 
 
2. Should Constitutions Endure? 

 There is no one-size-fits-all answer to the normative question of whether constitutional endurance 
is a good thing.113 The general answer seems to be: it depends.114 It would seem self-defeating to adopt a 
constitution that will have the same shelf-life of ordinary legislation. As Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 
suggest, “[w]e assume that constitutions are bargains among elites that are meantat least by their 
authorsto be enduring.”115 
 While others have identified common empirical elements shared by constitutions that have 
achieved longevity,116 I propose that the main source to locate an answer lies in factors such as legitimacy 
and authority, as well as connection and fidelity. In particular, I believe that when a constitutional creation 
process enjoys legitimacy and authority, and when the resulting content maintains a connection with future 
generations, thus commanding its fidelity, then constitutional endurance should be sought. 
 But there are more general reasons why some sort of substantial constitutional longevity can be 
characterized as positive.117 According to Ozan Varol, these include issues like: (1) promoting stability; (2) 
avoiding negative changes; and (3) facilitating social consensus.118 In that sense, constitutional endurance 
“is not necessarily undesirable from a normative perspective.”119 For their part, Elkins, Ginsburg, and 
Melton suggest that constitutional longevity can encourage democratic participation, economic 
development, national unity, and political stability.120  
 As we can see, stability is a recurring theme. And as a general rule, it seems correct, but with an 
important caveat: that the constitution still commands legitimacy, authority, connection, and fidelity.121 In 
that sense, the key normative issue is context-specific: does the original constitutional consensus still hold? 
This refers to both the question of legitimacy and authority as to process, as well as connection and fidelity 
as to substantive content.122 Stability becomes undemocratic and counter-revolutionary when the present 

110  See generally id. at 5-6. 
111  Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 80 (2018) [hereinafter Constitutional 
Amendment]. 
112  See id. 
113  See Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 7. 
114  See id. at 7, 208. See also Varol, supra note 20,, at 906-07; TOM GINSBURG, Constitutional Endurance, in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 112, 112-13 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011). 
115  Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 7. 
116  See Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 8. According to the authors, among these empirical traits are inclusiveness, flexibility, and 
specificity. 
117  See Varol, supra note 20, at 907. 
118  See id. 
119  See id.; see also Ku, supra note 16, at 538 (stating that constitutional change should be rare). 
120  Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 5; see also Ginsburg, supra note 114, at 113 (discussing the positive aspects of stability). 
121  See discussion supra Subsections II.B-C; see also Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 75 (stating there can be concerns of legitimacy and 
therefore the endurance of a constitution when “conditions change.”); Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 211 (discussing how connection helps to 
integrate “new social forces,” thereby increasing the endurance of a constitution). 
122  In fact, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton hint at this combination by identifying content and drafting process as factors that go into 
constitutional design. I go further and propose that the drafting process, by way of legitimacy and authority, and content, by way of connection 
and fidelity, will play a critical role on terms of a constitution’s endurance. 

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society no longer feels bound by the constitution.123 Stability should only be an overriding factor when there 
is doubt as to whether the original social consensus still holds.124 
 If the original social consensus still holds, then endurance should be encouraged and characterized 
as positive from a normative standpoint.125 If the consensus has broken, then the constitution should not 
endure, and its longevity should be characterized negatively.126 Here, stability does not justify constitutional 
endurance. As we will see, this social consensus in terms of endurance is inherently linked with the process 
of creation, and if the constitution that was originally adopted still reflects the basic or overarching views 
and preferences of the social majority.127 
 As previewed, if the element of connection and fidelity fades or weakens, then the stronger the 
sense of legitimacy and authority the process must be; and vice versa.128 Eventually, the need for substantive 
connection will prevail, triggering the need for constitutional change.129 On the other hand, if the 
constitutional structure manages to create or enhance the social consensus behind it, constitutional 
endurance will be beneficial and should be encouraged as a normative matter. 
 
3. Why Constitutions Endure? 
 
 This brings us to the next issue: why do constitutions endure? As previewed, I believe constitutions 
endure when the current society views the original process as legitimate and authoritative,130 and the current 
society shares enough agreement with the constitution’s substantive content to produce social connection 
and fidelity. As we saw, this social connection and fidelity exists when the constitution’s substantive content 
still adequately reflects the popular will and the policy preferences of the social majority, or there is, at 
least, a critical level of it.131 
 If one of these two sets of factors are eroded or weakened, there must be a corresponding 
strengthening of the other. Between these two sets, I believe the deciding factor will be connection and 
fidelity,132 because eventually the current social majority will want the constitution to reflect its own policy 
preferences, independent of their acceptance of the validity of the constitution’s creation. In that sense, I 
agree with Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton when they state that “[a] constitution will be maintained only if it 
makes sense to those who live under its dictates, so a crucial quality of any successful constitution is that it 
be self-enforcing.”133 
 For example, if the current society has begun to drift away from the substantive content of the 
constitution, there must be a stronger sense of legitimacy and authority in terms of process of creation. In 
this instance, the current society, while disagreeing with some or even most of the policy content of the 

123  See Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 38, 40. See also Elster, supra note 104 (implying that the partiality of a constitution created by a 
minority is “tyrannical”). 
124  See generally infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text. 
125  Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 40 (“[S]ometimes the real defeat of democracy is actually the frustration of the popular will 
reflected in the constitutional text, as long as that popular will, of course, holds.”). 
126  See id. at 38-39.  
127  See infra notes 130-31, 133 and accompanying text and pp. 30, 33. 
128  See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. 
129  See infra notes 130-31, 133 and accompanying text. 
130  Blount et al., supra note 24, at 15-16 (“public involvement in constitutional adoption…was positively correlated with constitutional 
life span, at least for democracies”); Kay, supra note 92, at 715 (“Long-term acceptance of a constitution requires a continuing regard for the 
process that brought into being”). 
131  Ku, supra note 16, at 539 (stating that the continued legitimacy of a constitution will depend on whether it still represents the will of 
the People as a whole). 
132  See Blount et al., supra note 24, 52 (“Legitimacy is conditional on factors other than process”). But this requires two caveats. First, 
that as to the stage of constitutional creation, process is the main source of legitimacy. Second, that it is during the endurance stage that process 
begins to lose some of its normative force, thus requiring the additional normative weight provided by substantive connection and fidelity. 
133  See Elkins et al., supra note 35. See also, Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 43 (“In the end, constitutions are as strong as the social 
consensus behind them”); Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, Looking for the Correct Tool for the Job: Methodological Models of Constitutional 
Interpretation and Adjudication, 52 REV. JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA DE P.R. 213, 218-19 (2018) (“The success of a constitution 
rests on constituted popular acceptance, if not of each and every word contained in the document itself, of the constitutional project itself) 
(Emphasis in original); Ginsburg, supra note 114, 116 (“Constitutions must…be self-enforcing” through a democratic system of citizen self-
government). 
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constitution, will still recognize it as valid because of the sheer legitimizing force generated by its process 
of creation. On the other hand, if the current society starts questioning the legitimacy and authority of the 
original process of creation, a stronger substantive connection to its content will be needed to ensure 
endurance. 
 In that sense, constitutional endurance “is neither inevitable nor irreversible.”134 It depends. Instead 
of looking for context-free universal answers, the desirability of constitutional longevity lies in the 
normative factors we’ve analyzed in this article.135 In that sense, “[w]hile constitutions no doubt require 
continuous reenactment through ongoing practices, they also involve self-conscious institutional choices 
that can become quite sticky once adopted.”136  
 As such, there is a critical link between legitimacy and authority on the one hand and connection 
and fidelity on the other. This link, while not causal, can be re-enforcing: a legitimate and authoritative 
constitution can actually condition society into accepting its substantive content, thus generating the crucial 
connection and fidelity necessary for constitutional longevity.137 On the other hand, a transcendental break 
with the current constitutional order can actually lead the People to conclude, retroactively, that the original 
creation process can now be seen as lacking legitimacy and authority.138  
 
4. Endurance and Constitutional Types 
 
 Revolutionary processes of constitutional creation tend to generate constitutions full of 
revolutionary substantive content.139 Many of these constitutions can be characterized as teleological and 
post-liberal.140 As it relates to the issue of endurance, these types of constitutions face an interesting 
challenge. If they accurately reflect the deeply-held policy preferences of the social majority, and that 
consensus remains substantially unaltered, then the constitution has a greater chance of surviving the 
passage of time.141 This can create a self-reinforcing cycle of the constitution as the reflection of the policy 
preferences of the social majority and as the generator of those preferences.142  
 But, unlike the more “neutral framework” constitutions that mostly deal with setting up the 
structures of governments and the basic liberal procedural rights that make them work,143 these 
constitutions, precisely because they take a position as to substantive public policy positions, are 
permanently at risk of polarization.144 In other words, there will always be sections of the population that 
strongly disagree with some of those entrenched policy positions and will see the constitution as an obstacle 
to their world view.145 If the social majority or their preferences weaken, then the social support for the 
constitution is bound to erode as well. When this happens, the continued endurance of the constitution 
becomes an open question.146 But framework constitutions, because they do not take these positions, can 
just as easily work for the benefit of opposing policy views, so neither side may be eager to replace it, thus 
allowing for greater endurance.147 
 

134  Varol, supra note 20, at 907. 
135  See supra Section II. 
136  Blount et al., supra note 24, at 10.  
137  See Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 80. 
138  See Lau, supra note 9 at 248-49; see also Unconstitutional Constitutions, supra note 44, at 171. 
139  See Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 34-35, 40. 
140  See id. at 35. 
141  See id. at 34. 
142  See id. at 35, 37. 
143  See id. at 37. 
144  See Elster, supra note 104, at 18.  
145   Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 656 (2008). 
146  Cf. Farinacci-Fernós, Post-Liberal Constitutionalism, supra note 1, at 40, 43 (evaluating whether, when the majority or its policy 
preference changes, a substantive constitution will break). 
147  See id. at 28-29. 
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B. Change148 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 All constitutional systems deal with the dead hand problem149: “No interpretive method avoids the 
dead hand issue because no reputable method disregards constitutional text.”150  This is inherently linked to 
the issue of what Professor Lee Strang calls “challenge of change.”151 The problem of change is inevitable.152 
As I previewed, I believe that connection and fidelity will be the overriding factors in terms of when and 
how a constitution is changed, whether partially or completely.153 How a constitution is changed will also 
depend on the legitimacy and authority of the process used to accomplish that change.154 
 When a constitution reflects the current views of societymeaning that the original constitutional 
project is still valid and adhered to for the most part155the constitution becomes a majoritarian instrument 
that allows the people to defend themselves against the malfunctions of ordinary politics.156 As such, “the 
dead cannot literally govern our choices . . . . The living bear responsibility for continuing or discarding old 
arrangements.”157 In the end, it is still up to us. As Adam Samaha explains, “a law may properly extend 
across generations if the current generation retains the power to repeal [it].”158 The question we will address 
shortly is how that repeal power can and should be exercised. 
 Alternatively, when the social consensus breaks and majoritarian policy preferences shift 
decisively, the constitution can become an obstacle to democratic self-rule, since it entrenches policy 
preferences that are no longer held by the social majority.159 This takes us back to the issue of illegitimate 
entrenchment. In this instance, while the original act of entrenchment was legitimate at that time, a change 
in the policy preferences of the social majority breaks the necessary connection and fidelity needed to 
maintain the original constitutional project and its content.160 
 The greater the legitimacy and authority generated by the original constitutional creation process, 
the greater the loss of connection and fidelity must be in order to conclude that the original constitution 
must be substantially changed.161 In the end, no matter how legitimate and authoritative the original process 
was, eventually, the overriding factor will be connection and fidelity162. However, the new exercise of 
constitutional politics will determine the form of the necessary change: replacement of interpretive method, 
discrete amendment, substantial overhaul, outright replacement, or a combination of two or more of these 
methods.163  

148  Some, though by no means all or even most, of the issues discussed in this section are based on a chapter of the author’s S.J.D. 
Dissertation Original Explication and Post-Liberal Constitutionalism: The Role of Intent and History in the Judicial Enforcement of Teleological 
Constitutions (Georgetown University Law Center, 2017). 
149  See Samaha, supra note 145, at 609 (“[F]ollowing an ancient constitution amounts to dead generations governing the living.”). 
150  Id. at 615-16. 
151  Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”: Abduced-Based Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which 
Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 927, 928 (2009). For an ‘originalist’ approach to legal 
change, see Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (2015). Professor Sachs 
recognizes that “[i]n any real-world legal system, the law is a product of both authorized and unauthorized changes.” Id. at 843. He tends to 
identify formal amendment and other legally sanctioned procedures as modes of authorized change. 
152  See James A. Gardner, Practice-Driven Changes to Constitutional Structures of Governance, 69 ARK. L. REV. 335, 337-38 (2016). 
153  See supra p. 2. 
154  See generally infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text. 
155  See Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1998); Strang, 
supra note 151, at 932. 
156  Ackerman, supra note 33. 
157  Samaha, supra note 145, at 622; Accord Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1051. 
158  Samaha, supra note 145, at 620. 
159  See generally Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1014-15, 1047. 
160  See Elster, supra note 104, at 18. 
161  See Ku, supra note 16, at 538 (arguing that constitutional change should be by “supermajority”); See also Samaha, supra note 145, at 
651 (stating that maintaining a constitution is a moral, or a connection and fidelity, issue as opposed to an issue of authority, or legitimacy and 
authority). 
162  See Samaha, supra note 145, at 659. 
163  See Gardner, supra note 152, at 346-47; See also Constitutional Amendment, supra note 111, at 3-5, 8. 
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 Change comes in many shapes and sizes. Not every update constitutes change in the constitutional 
system.164 An obvious method of change is amendment or replacement.165 Depending on the procedural and 
structural aspects of a particular constitutional system, this can be a difficult or relatively easy process.166 It 
would seem that the stronger the social movement to replace the constitution is, the easier it will be. As 
such, constitutional change is possible only when there is a significant shift in constitutional politics.167 This 
serves as a middle point between an unmovable dead hand and the instability of ordinary politics which is 
premised upon temporary majorities. Constitutional change requires more than just a temporary majority; 
change should be available but should not be so easy.168 Shifts in constitutional policy preferences must be 
decisive in order to replace the prior consensus.169 
 Except for important issues of stability and institutional maturity, constitutional change is not 
inherently bad or something that should be avoided as a general rule. Social majorities evolve and policy 
preferences change.170 Once an issue, set of issues, or an over-arching political goal transcends ordinary 
politics and becomes the focus of constitutional politics, constitutional replacement or amendment is 
appropriate.171 
 But straight-out constitutional replacement is the weapon of last resort in the arena of constitutional 
change. There are other, less formal, avenues for change.172 And here is where it gets tricky. After all, the 
point of clearly written and carefully drafted constitutions that serve as higher law is to provide certainty 
and allow a people to self-govern without powerful minority forces sabotaging those efforts by way of 
informal devices such as under-enforcement.173 It is also meant to constrain courts in terms of substituting 
democratic preferences with their own.174 Yet, any model of constitutional adjudication must address the 
issue of change outside formal amendment.175 Constitutional politics force that approach.176 It can’t be an 
all-or-nothing scenario. Decontextualized rigidity should be avoided; there is still a central role for politics 
to play, but it should be constitutional instead of ordinary. 
 There are four important avenues for change: (1) informal and extralegal change in interpretive 
methodology; (2) formal and legal amendment; (3) formal and legal overhaul; and (4) formal replacement, 
which can be legal, extralegal, or even illegal.177 Each tool should be considered in this order, depending 
on the strength of the remaining social consensus. Less drastic methods of change should be used, unless a 
momentous shift has occurred, as with the exercise of constitutional politics or the presence of a 
constitutional moment.  
 A combination of all of these can also occur. For example, an informal and extralegal change in 
interpretive methodology can be accompanied by formal and legal discrete amendments that remove the 
greatest textual obstacles and allow the courts to implement the new interpretive models.178 The Portuguese 

164  Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1015; Calabresi, supra note 155, at 1385. 
165  See Varol, supra note 47, at 901. 
166  See id. at 906. 
167  See Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 8, 73, 82. 
168  See Elster, supra note 104. 
169  See Lau, supra note 9, at 233. 
170  Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin, Political Model of Social Evolution, 108 (Supp. 4) 21292-21296 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 1 (Dec. 22, 2011),  https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1019454108, archived at 
http://perma.cc/H9B7-R88X. 
171  David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1461 (2001). 
172  See id. 
173  See id. at 1503. 
174  See Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1030. 
175  See Strauss, supra note 171, at 1469. 
176  See id. at 1461. 
177  See id. at 1459. See also Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 74 (explaining that constitutional replacement is more costly than either 
reinterpretation or amendment). 
178  See Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 74. 
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experience of the 1970s and 1980s is the perfect example for this type of combined exercise of constitutional 
politics.179 
 
2. Constitutional Moments and new exercises of Constitutional Politics 
 
 Constitutional politics can be exercised legally, extralegally, or even illegally.180 Of course, the 
closer it comes to extralegal or illegal actions, the stronger the exercise of constitutional politics must be.181 
A revolutionary and democratic process can generate the normative force to overcome this lack of 
legality.182 As we saw when analyzing constitutional creation, this normative force will create a new legality 
that will allow the subsequent structures to be accepted as valid by the political community.183 
 This takes us to professor Ackerman’s proposal of constitutional moments.184 These constitutional 
moments are mostly extralegal, since they do not engage the legally available formal devices of 
constitutional amendment but are not directly illegal.185 These constitutional moments are the result of the 
extralegal exercise of constitutional politics by the social majority.186 The main consequence of these 
constitutional moments is a change in the interpretive methodology used by courts to apply the 
constitutional text.187  
 
3. Tools of Constitutional Change 
 
i. Changes in Interpretative Methodologies 
 
 The least disruptive avenue of bringing about constitutional change is through the adoption of a 
new method of interpretation.188 In other words, the constitution does not formally change as with an 
amendment, overhaul, or replacement.189 The main result will be a new approach to constitutional 
construction in terms of the normative and legal effects of the text.190 This alternative is informal and can 
be mostly characterized as extralegal.191 
 The decision to adopt a particular methodological model of interpretation in the first place is 
directly related mostly to the issue of legitimacy and authority, particularly right after the process of 
creation. The decision to maintain that model is a combination of legitimacy and authority as to process on 
the one hand, and connection and fidelity as to substance and content on the other.192 
 The same logic applies to the decision to abandon a particular method of interpretation and to adopt 
a new one. As Adam Samaha explains, “the best interpretive method might well vary over time.”193 This 

179  See generally António Costa Pinto, Constitution-Making and the Democratization of Portugal: An Enduring Legacy, 34 no. 1 
PORTUGUESE STUD. 35 (2018) (providing an explanation of formal and informal constitutional changes in Portugal since 1976); ELKINS ET AL., 
supra note 35, at 74 (a general reference to a combined exercise of textual amendment and changes in interpretive methodologies). 
180  See generally Sujit Choudry, Ackerman’s higher lawmaking in comparative constitutional perspective: Constitutional moments as 
constitutional failures, INT’L. J. CONST. L. (2008) 6 (2): 193 (summarizing Ackerman’s identification of the various exercises of constitutional 
politics). 
181  See id. at 229–30; Lau, supra note 9, at 248-49. 
182  Choudry, supra note 180, at 206. 
183  See Blount et al., supra note 24, at 52–53; Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 362. 
184  Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1022. For a very illustrative analysis of the operation of Ackerman’s constitutional moments model, see 
Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, The Seeds of Change: Popular Protests as Constitutional Moments, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 363, 372 (2015). 
185  Choudry, supra note 180, at 197–98. 
186  See id. 
187  See id. at 198. 
188  Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1518 
(2009). 
189  Benvindo, supra note 184, at 406–07. 
190  See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 111 (2010); Randy E. Barnett, 
Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 69–70 (2011). 
191  See Strauss, supra note 171, at 1469. 
192  See generally Richard H. Fallon Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005) 
193  Samaha, supra note 145, at 612. 
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happens when there is a significant shift in constitutional politics short of formal amendment or 
replacement.194 Thus, when the original social consensus that (1) gave legitimacy and authority to the 
constitutional project because of its process of creation and (2) was supported by continued connection and 
fidelity as to the content of the constitution itself erodes or partially breaks, there are grounds for switching 
interpretive methodologies.195 
 A change in interpretive methodology represents a shift in constitutional allegiance.196 When that 
happens, the link between text (and its accompanying history and explication) and legal effect and doctrine 
is weakened, precisely because the constitutional project has weakened.197 If the constitutional project is 
finally broken or abandoned, then formal amendment, overhaul or replacement ensues.198 As such, the level 
of continued allegiance and fidelity to the original constitutional project, or lack thereof, will determine the 
type of method of interpretation used by courts and, in particular, the authoritativeness of the framers.199 
For example, a loss of connection and fidelity with the original constitutional project will most likely result 
in the abandonment of methods of interpretation that privilege adoption history and intent. The Chilean 
experience of the 1980s and 1990s is a good example of this dynamic.200 
 However, sometimes courts resist changing their interpretive methodologies.201 Also, there are 
situations in which even a change in interpretive approach will not be sufficient to accommodate the new 
constitutional situation.202 When this happens, more formal and direct tools of constitutional change may 
be needed, such as amendment or overhaul. 
 
ii. Amendment 
 
 By definition, amendments are necessarily formal and legal.203 The end-result is the subtraction, 
modification, or addition of text to the formal constitution.204 Amendments can remove problematic or 
anachronistic provisions that no longer carry sufficient popular support.205 They can also add new policy 
provisions that can impact the entire constitutional project.206 The adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth , 
and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution after the Civil War are an example of this type of 
paradigm-shifting constitutional amendment.207 The characterization of that process as a constitutional 
moment strengthens the normative impact of the Amendments to the overarching content of the 
constitution.208 

194  Id. at 668–69. 
195  See Strauss, supra note 171, at 1461. 
196  See Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (2010) (“[A]uthentic 
constitutional reasoning can include consideration of strongly held public opinions as one of its constituent parts, so long as ‘strongly held public 
opinion’ means something approaching consensus rather than simply the views of the majority.”). 
197  See Bernal, supra note 10, at 494–95; Kay, supra note 92, at 757.  
198  See Kay, supra 92, at 728 (For example, the constitutional project of the Articles of Confederation was broken or abandoned, resulting 
in its replacement.). 
199  See Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1015 (“[W]e must transcend the Framer’s vision if we are to make our Constitution fit the needs of a 
modern democratic society. [There is an] urgent need for heroic reconceptualization of the Constitution in general, the Supreme Court in 
particular. [T]he task for constitutional law is to define a role for the Supreme Court . . . .”). 
200  See generally Druscilla L. Scribner Distributing Political Power: The Constitutional Tribunal in Post-Authoritarian Chile, in 
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Diana Kapiszewski et al. eds. Cambridge University Press 2013). 
201  Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, supra note 56, at 
195 (“Changing social circumstances and understandings will often make specific constitutional modes outmoded, yet in most countries, courts 
do not respond to this by changing their interpretation of such rules.”). 
202  See Cain & Noll, supra note 188, at 1518. 
203  Dixon & Holden, supra note 201, at 195. 
204  See Constitutional Amendment, supra note 111, at 11; Strauss, supra note 171, at 1458 (quoting Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 
422, 428 (1956)). 
205  See Farinacci-Fernós, supra note 1, at 40. 
206  See Strauss, supra note 171, at 1460. 
207  Dixon, supra note 201, at 97. 
208  See id. at 98. 
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 As Rosalind Dixon explains, “[f]ormal provision for constitutional amendment is now a near 
universal feature of national constitutions.”209 One reason for this is constitutional self-preservation.210 In 
other words, the constitution includes a pressure release valve that allows the community to make 
alterations to the document as opposed to throwing it away when there has been a shift in constitutional 
preferences.211 In these circumstances, the constitution entices the community to consider discrete change 
to radical substitution.212 
 
iii. Overhaul 
 
 While technically done through the amendment process, constitutional overhaul requires separate 
analysis.213 While amendments can be discrete and limited, constitutional overhaul tends to be much more 
substantial and comprehensive.214 In this context, amendments are overarching and multiple.215 When the 
process is complete, the constitution may be somewhat unrecognizable, but its basic core and essence are 
still intact. Many overhauls can combine legal, extralegal, illegal, formal, and informal mechanisms and 
elements.216 
 Of course, some overhauls are so wide-ranging that they become the functional equivalent of 
replacement.217 Full-scale revisions are an example of this phenomenon.218 Yet the overhaul should not be 
discarded as an alternative to outright replacement, particularly when the reason for avoiding replacement 
is to preserve some of the legitimacy and authority of the original constitutional project. As such, 
constitutional overhaul recognizes that the existing constitutional order has weakened considerably but still 
possesses enough redeeming qualities.219 An example of this can be that the new political community lacks 
sufficient connection and fidelity to the old constitutional order, but still accepts its legitimacy and authority 
and wishes to maintain or build on it. 
 This difficult balance between amendment and replacement leaves room for constitutional overhaul 
to be either legal or, on the contrary, extralegal or even illegal.220 The closer the overhaul is to discrete 
amendment, the more likely the process will be carried out through existing legal processes, structures, and 
channels.221 On the other hand, the closer the overhaul is to outright replacement, the more likely that 
extralegal or illegal processes, structures, and channels will be deployed.222 The same thing applies as to 
the formal-informal dichotomy. 
 
iv. Replacement 
 

209  See id. at 96. 
210  See id. at 97 (“[F]ormal constitutional amendment procedures therefore serve not only to promote the chances of large-scale 
constitutional change, but also to increase the chances that such change will occur . . . within existing constitutional frameworks, rather than via 
processes of whole-scale constitutional revision or overthrow.”). 
211  Elkins et al., supra note 78, at 55 (“Amendments . . . forestall constitutional death . . . .”). 
212  Id. 
213  See Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 55 (“For example, South Korea’s six republics have each involved complete constitutional 
overhauls adopted through the formal process of amendment of the previous constitution.”). 
214  ee Tom Ginsburg & Richard A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1610 (2010). 
215  See id. 
216  See Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 55, 59 (South Korea’s overhauls were adopted via formal, legal processes). 
217  See Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 214, at 1610; Cain & Noll, supra note 188, at 1521–24. 
218  Id. 
219  See Varol, supra note 20, at 938 (status quo bias may be another reason why at least some redeeming qualities of the prior constitution 
are deemed worth keeping). 
220  See Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 55, 59. 
221  Id. 
222  See Kay, supra note 92,, at 725, 728, 735 (arguing that a significant departure from the current constitution must be grounded on the 
illegal or extralegal actions of a constituent authority and providing the example of the extralegal or illegal replacement of the Articles of 
Confederation with the U.S. Constitution). 
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 Unlike amendment and overhaul, replacement constitutes a displacement of the previous 
constitution.223 While the new one may replicate some of the content of its antecessor and offer other 
avenues of continuity, as a conceptual matter, the new constitution is wholly independent of the previous 
one.224 As a result, the previous constitution loses all of its independent normative power. It can only live 
on as a supplementary guide to interpret the new constitution in situations where the latter emulated or 
copied the former.225 
 In that sense, “the distinction between an amendment and replacement is important.”226 Also, while 
amendments are necessarily adopted through existing legal processes, structures, and channels, 
constitutional replacement can be legal, extralegal, or illegal.227 If it is done through processes, structures, 
or channels that are extralegal or illegal, the move to replace the constitution must satisfy the normative 
elements we discussed earlier when analyzing the creation stage.228 In other words, it must be a real exercise 
of constitutional politics that generates its own legitimacy and authority, so that the replacement action is 
seen as valid, even if contrary to the previous legality. 
 As a result, replacement brings the stages of constitutional existence full circle. If constitutional 
creation constitutes one constitution’s end is another’s beginning, then constitutional replacement means 
that one constitution’s beginning is another’s end. When this happens, the stages of constitutional existence 
starts once again, and the new constitution must attempt to survive its birth, endure over time, and resist 
future replacement challenges.229  
 
C. Connection between Stages 
 
 There is no inherent link between a constitution’s creation, its endurance, and its eventual 
modifications, including replacement.230 Constitutions that were the result of a highly democratic and 
popular process of creation that generated a substantial level of legitimacy and authority, sometimes fail to 
produce sufficient connection and fidelity with future generations so as to survive unscathed.231 Portugal is 
an example of this.232 On the other hand, constitutions that were adopted by elites through less than 
democratic means manage to endure because they manage to receive acceptance by the population.233 The 
United States is a partial example of this.234 
 But, there is a connection between the normative factors that are present in each stage.235 For 
example, a constitution that was adopted by a highly democratic, public, popular, participatory, and socially 
transcendental process of creation will generate considerable legitimacy and authority that will carry it on 
to the endurance stage.236 Now, in order for this constitution to fail at the endurance stage, there must be a 
significant gap between its substantive content and the views of the community.237 In other words, in order 
to defeat a constitution that carries such a high level of legitimacy and authority, an equally substantial lack 
of connection and fidelity is required to negate the normative force of that legitimacy and authority and 

223  See Constitutional Amendment, supra note 111, at 9–10. 
224  See Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 59; Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1038. 
225  See Mazo, supra note 51, at 838–40 (arguing that the old constitution serves not only as a starting point for the new constitution but 
also as a reference for making future changes); Samaha, supra note 145, at 363 (making the case that the Articles of Confederation are used to 
interpret the U.S. Constitution). 
226  Elkins et al., supra note 35, at 55. 
227  See Constitutional Amendment, supra note 111, at 11 (stating that an amendment that is created outside the authority of the 
constitution is effectively a new constitution, drawing the inference that the replacement was created extralegally or illegally). 
228  See id. at 16 (suggesting that a replacement constitution must be legitimated by constituent power). 
229  See generally Ku, supra note 16. 
230  See generally Lau, supra note 9. 
231  See generally Pinto, supra note 179. 
232  Id. 
233  See Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1020, 1022; Kay, supra note 92, 756. 
234  See Constitutional Amendment, supra note 111, at 24. 
235  See Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning (1997), available 
at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1102&context=facpub, archived at https://perma.cc/GLH3-R5PN 
236  See generally Blount et al., supra note 24. 
237               Id. 
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condemn the constitution to a short life. At the same time, a constitution that lacks a considerable initial 
level of legitimacy and authority will need substantial connection and fidelity to survive the next phases 
that follow creation.  As such, we can conclude that the stronger the level of legitimacy and authority 
generated by the process of creation, the higher the chances of endurance (and thus the lower the chances 
of early modification or replacement), unless the constitutional project fails to generate sufficient 
substantive connection and fidelity or there is a new exercise of constitutional politics of equal legitimacy 
and authority that displaces the original project. Also, the weaker the level of legitimacy and authority 
generated by the creation, the lower the chances of endurance (and thus the higher the chances of early 
modification or replacement), unless the constitutional project is able to generate sufficient substantive 
connection and fidelity and there is no new exercise of constitutional politics that displaces it. 
 In summary: (1) legitimacy and authority will be crucial during creation; (2) both legitimacy and 
authority, on the one hand, and connection and fidelity, on the other, will interact as they relate to endurance; 
and (3) connection and fidelity will be the determining factors as to the issue of change.238 In the end, 
legitimacy and authority only take you so far, generating initial acceptance. As time goes by, the continued 
acceptance of the constitutional project will depend more and more on connection and fidelity. As a result, 
there is a sliding scale between authority and legitimacy on one side, and connection and fidelity on the 
other.239 
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS 

 The model of constitutional stages discussed in this article has both general application to all 
constitutions and particular application to revolutionary constitutions. This revolutionary characterization 
mostly relates to both the process of creation and the substantive content of the constitution itself.  
 Revolutionary constitutions face particular challenges as to their creation, endurance, and 
modifications.240 The revolutionary character of the constitutional project will, in turn, interact with the 
different normative features we discussed earlier, such as legality, legitimacy, fidelity, and formality, 
among others. As such, the success of any revolutionary constitutional project will depend on the presence 
of these normative elements during all stages of constitutional existence. As we have seen, (1) the 
legitimacy and authoritative status of the creation process, and (2) the continued level of connection and 
fidelity between future generations and the original constitutional project will determine how revolutionary 
constitutions are created, why they are able to endure, and how they interact with the different possibilities 
relating to change. As a result, revolutionary constitutions represent one of the most intense exercises of 
constitutional politics.  
 The success of a revolutionary constitution will depend, in the end, on a continued exercise of 
constitutional politics, spread out in time and through different generations. More importantly, it will 
depend on how the revolutionary constitution is created and whether it has been able to actually transform 
society, thus maintaining the all-important connection. A truly successful revolutionary constitution will 
not only endure; it will directly aid a self-governing People in the process of radically transforming society. 

238  See generally Ku, supra note 16. 
239  See generally Ku, supra note 16. 
240  See generally Elkins et al., supra note 35. 
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